Emergency destruction of LUKS partition

[Eric H. Christensen]

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Someone asked me about this recently and I haven't had a chance to fully wrap my head around the solution but thought it was an interesting scenario.

Background:
Someone knows you have encrypted your computer using LUKS.  They convince you to enter (or otherwise provide) your passphrase via the large wrench method[0].

Realcrypt method:
There is plausible deniability (if properly implemented) whereas you could provide the person with the alternate passphrase which would give them access to a portion of the encrypted partition but not your real working partition.

LUKS:
There is no way to provide plausible deniability.

Proposed solution:
LUKS provides four key slots to use for decrypting a partition.  How about have one key slot that when used immediately implements a deletion of the encrypted partition (or at least the key record).

Thoughts?

[0] http://www.xkcd.org/538/

- -- Eric

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Eric "Sparks" Christensen
Fedora Project

sparks at fedoraproject.org - sparks at redhat.com
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