I wonder why API token has expiration time just 30 days? It seems too short for me.
E.g. Amazon have token without expiration (AFAIK). Fedora koji cert is valid for one year.
Can we have expiration time longer? E.g. one year? Objections?
Mirek
On Tue, 2013-06-18 at 10:12 +0200, Miroslav Suchy wrote:
I wonder why API token has expiration time just 30 days? It seems too short for me.
E.g. Amazon have token without expiration (AFAIK). Fedora koji cert is valid for one year.
Can we have expiration time longer? E.g. one year? Objections?
One year seems a lot to me. That's one year when someone can build packages and we have no way of saying whether it is our fellow Fedora contributor or not. I would be better around 3 months, 6 months max.
Pierre
On 06/18/2013 10:15 AM, Pierre-Yves Chibon wrote:
One year seems a lot to me. That's one year when someone can build packages and we have no way of saying whether it is our fellow Fedora contributor or not. I would be better around 3 months, 6 months max.
How is this safer? How this differ from 30 days or even one day?
If user token is compromised then it is his duty to generate new token (which will automatically invalid previous token).
Lets assume super idiot user who will generate new token and intermediately post in on Facebook. It actually then does not matter if expiration period is two days or 30 days or one year.
If one user account is compromised only his repos will be compromised. No one should be affected. It will be fault of such users. Can we rather assume that our users are smart? And instead of bothering them to regenerate token every month, provide them with tools to detect that they account has been compromised. E.g provide them list of IP address which used their account. Do you agree?
Mirek
On Tue, 2013-06-18 at 11:01 +0200, Miroslav Suchy wrote:
On 06/18/2013 10:15 AM, Pierre-Yves Chibon wrote:
One year seems a lot to me. That's one year when someone can build packages and we have no way of saying whether it is our fellow Fedora contributor or not. I would be better around 3 months, 6 months max.
How is this safer? How this differ from 30 days or even one day?
If user token is compromised then it is his duty to generate new token (which will automatically invalid previous token).
Lets assume super idiot user who will generate new token and intermediately post in on Facebook. It actually then does not matter if expiration period is two days or 30 days or one year.
If one user account is compromised only his repos will be compromised. No one should be affected. It will be fault of such users.
Well, the "No one should be affected" is not entirely true. I'm packaging <super cool game>, use copr to build it, advertise it. My account is compromised, I don't realize it. Attacker uses the token to build <super cool game + my own little backdoor>, all the users of the repo get the update and "my own little backdoor" with it :)
You're gonna say it isn't much different from the current situation w/ the koji certificate.
Can we rather assume that our users are smart? And instead of bothering them to regenerate token every month, provide them with tools to detect that they account has been compromised. E.g provide them list of IP address which used their account. Do you agree?
So yes, it is problaby not much different. It's just that 1 year seems a lot to me but maybe it's just me :)
The list of IP address used w/ an account can be nice, but as soon as you start using "public" access point (you build a package in a train, airport, train station...) then there is a new IP which you probably won't be able to tell 2 months later if it was you or not. So that might not help here.
Pierre
On 06/18/2013 11:21 AM, Pierre-Yves Chibon wrote:
Well, the "No one should be affected" is not entirely true. I'm packaging <super cool game>, use copr to build it, advertise it. My account is compromised, I don't realize it. Attacker uses the token to build <super cool game + my own little backdoor>, all the users of the repo get the update and "my own little backdoor" with it:)
You're gonna say it isn't much different from the current situation w/ the koji certificate.
OK. So lets say 6 months? It can be changed anytime in future. OK?
Mirek
On Tue, 2013-06-18 at 13:36 +0200, Miroslav Suchy wrote:
On 06/18/2013 11:21 AM, Pierre-Yves Chibon wrote:
Well, the "No one should be affected" is not entirely true. I'm packaging <super cool game>, use copr to build it, advertise it. My account is compromised, I don't realize it. Attacker uses the token to build <super cool game + my own little backdoor>, all the users of the repo get the update and "my own little backdoor" with it:)
You're gonna say it isn't much different from the current situation w/ the koji certificate.
OK. So lets say 6 months? It can be changed anytime in future. OK?
Ok for me and indeed, we can always re-visit it later.
Pierre
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Miroslav Suchý -
Pierre-Yves Chibon -
Toshio Kuratomi