On Di Mai 26 2009, Seth Vidal wrote:
On Tue, 26 May 2009, Till Maas wrote:
On Di Mai 26 2009, Jesse Keating wrote:
On Tue, 2009-05-26 at 17:44 +0200, Till Maas wrote:
A problem with phones is, that they are typically not as secure as hardware tokens. Users can install custom software on them. Also the phone may be compromised via bluetooth. It might be even possible to directly access text messages via bluetooth or maybe also wifi nowadays.
Wouldn't that be why you have to combine what comes up on your phone with the password you know, so that just the phone alone can't get you in?
Here is another attack scenario: The attacker first attacks the desktop to obtain the password. But then he also compromises the phone once it is connected to the desktop to synchronize some data, e.g. contacts, music or software. Then the attacker got both factors without having physical access on the phone.
Both of them assume an attacker targetting someone on our system.
Why is this? Even an attacker that got access to your desktop without specifically targetting a Fedora infrastructure team member can afterwards compromise your phone, once he noticed that you use it to login to Fedora. The browser cache or e-mails may indicate that you login to Fedora and some config files for phone synchronization can show the attacker, how the phone can be compromised.
Regards Till