On Sun, 2005-04-03 at 19:54 -0700, Anthony Green wrote:
On Sun, 2005-04-03 at 21:29 +0200, Roger Grosswiler wrote:
Since there is a kind of Java-Support with GCJ in FC4T1,shouldn't we better use this??? If yes, how to?
See gcjwebplugin: http://www.nongnu.org/gcjwebplugin/
The big problem with this today is that gcj has known problems with its sandbox security implementation. We need to fix those problems and do a full audit of libgcj before it makes sense to package gcjwebplugin.
I'm not fully aware of SELinux's capabilities yet, but I wonder if it's possible to sandbox our current libgcj for gcjwebplugin by writing strict SELinux policy. Does anybody know?
Depends on the desired granularity of protection and the extent to which the current architecture uses separate processes and exec-based transitions (although the latter is less of a constraint now that SELinux supports dynamic context transitions, I suppose).
Ultimately, you want a SELinux-aware jvm that uses the SELinux API to get policy decisions and apply them to its internal resources for finer- grained control as well as using the SELinux kernel controls to confine the entire process.