https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1191080
Tomas Hoger <thoger(a)redhat.com> changed:
What |Removed |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Priority|medium |low
Fixed In Version| |freetype 2.5.4
Summary|CVE-2014-9658 freetype: DoS |CVE-2014-9658 freetype:
|in the tt_face_load_kern |buffer over-read and
|function in sfnt/ttkern.c |integer underflow in
| |tt_face_load_kern()
Whiteboard|impact=moderate,public=2014 |impact=low,public=20141124,
|1124,reported=20150210,sour |reported=20150210,source=cv
|ce=cve,cvss2=3.7/AV:L/AC:H/ |e,cvss2=4.3/AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/
|Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P,fedora-all |C:N/I:N/A:P,cwe=CWE-20->CWE
|/freetype=affected,rhel-5/f |-190->CWE-125,rhel-4/freety
|reetype=new,rhel-6/freetype |pe=notaffected,rhel-5/freet
|=new,rhel-7/freetype=new |ype=affected,rhel-6/freetyp
| |e=affected,rhel-7/freetype=
| |affected,rhev-m-3/mingw-vir
| |t-viewer=affected,fedora-al
| |l/freetype=affected,fedora-
| |all/mingw-freetype=affected
| |,epel-7/mingw-freetype=affe
| |cted
Severity|medium |low
--- Comment #3 from Tomas Hoger <thoger(a)redhat.com> ---
Upstream bug is:
https://savannah.nongnu.org/bugs/?43672
Issue was fixed upstream in 2.5.4.
The issue here starts as a simple short buffer over-read. Existing check to
ensure enough input data is still available was incorrect:
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/tree/src/sfnt/ttk...
The length <= 6 only takes into account the previously read header:
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/tree/src/sfnt/ttk...
p is later incremented by 8 (but only the first two bytes are actually
read/accessed):
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/tree/src/sfnt/ttk...
However, when length is too short, p_next may be less than p, which leads to
integer underflow in (p_next - p) in this num_pairs check:
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/tree/src/sfnt/ttk...
The check aims to prevent further over-reads. Underflow bypasses the check and
makes it possible to read 6 * 0xffff bytes (num_pairs is short). Crash should
be possible.
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