I'm volunteering to run a GPG keysigning party at the FUDCon in Raleigh in January. Keysignings are good ways to get to meet people face-to-face (with a government-issued photo ID to boot!), and serves to extend the GPG Web of Trust.
See http://barcamp.org/FUDConRaleigh2008
for details on how to send me your keys beforehand.
hanks, Matt
Matt Domsch said the following on 12/12/2007 01:40 PM Pacific Time:
I'm volunteering to run a GPG keysigning party at the FUDCon in Raleigh in January. Keysignings are good ways to get to meet people face-to-face (with a government-issued photo ID to boot!), and serves to extend the GPG Web of Trust.
See http://barcamp.org/FUDConRaleigh2008
for details on how to send me your keys beforehand.
hanks, Matt
My key has expired and it is also associated with my Fedora account which raises a few questions to get straightened out before FUDCon:
1) Do I need to revoke my expired key? I'm not even sure if this can be done or matters.
2) Once I generate a new key, I assume I should add its fingerprint to my Fedora account--removing the existing one?
3) Do most people create keys that expire or is it okay to create one that does not?
Thanks, John
John Poelstra wrote:
My key has expired and it is also associated with my Fedora account which raises a few questions to get straightened out before FUDCon:
- Do I need to revoke my expired key?
No, you don't have to revoke it. In fact, you can remove or extend the expiration date and continue using your current key if you like.
I'm not even sure if this can be done or matters.
Yes, it can be done (as long as you still have the private key, of course).
- Once I generate a new key, I assume I should add its fingerprint
to my Fedora account--removing the existing one?
(I'll defer to someone that has more of a clue about the fedora account system. :)
- Do most people create keys that expire or is it okay to create
one that does not?
I don't know about most people, but I think it's okay to not have an expiration date on a key. You can also add one later if you change your mind. I have no expiration date on my primary key, but I do have one on the encryption subkey.
On Wed, 02 Jan 2008 17:30:15 -0800 John Poelstra poelstra@redhat.com wrote:
- Do most people create keys that expire or is it okay to create one
that does not?
I've heard that a good strategy if you're going to generate a non-expiring key is to generate the revocation key at the same time, and replicate that in even more places, so in the event that you lose your private key you can revoke it instead of waiting for it to expire.
Jesse Keating wrote:
I've heard that a good strategy if you're going to generate a non-expiring key is to generate the revocation key at the same time, and replicate that in even more places, so in the event that you lose your private key you can revoke it instead of waiting for it to expire.
I'd say that generating a revocation cert is always the first thing to do after creating a new key, whether it expires or not. You always want to be able to revoke a key if you get into a pinch for whatever reason.
Just peruse the archives of the pgp and gnupg lists and notice how often someone shows up with the "I uploaded a key to the keyserver and now I've lost the key because {my hard drive died,my dog ate it,etc}, so how do I delete the key from the keyservers?" problem. :)
Le mercredi 02 janvier 2008 à 17:30 -0800, John Poelstra a écrit :
My key has expired and it is also associated with my Fedora account which raises a few questions
You can easily extend the validity of a key which has expired. This way you get the security of a key that does hara-kiri after a while if you lose it, and the convenience of a stable long-term key.
Regards,
Nicolas Mailhot said the following on 01/03/2008 01:53 AM Pacific Time:
Le mercredi 02 janvier 2008 à 17:30 -0800, John Poelstra a écrit :
My key has expired and it is also associated with my Fedora account which raises a few questions
You can easily extend the validity of a key which has expired. This way you get the security of a key that does hara-kiri after a while if you lose it, and the convenience of a stable long-term key.
Regards,
Correct :)
I looked into it more and changed the expiration by:
1) gpg --edit <key> and then option "expire" 2) gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --send-keys <key> to make change public
John Poelstra wrote:
I looked into it more and changed the expiration by:
- gpg --edit <key> and then option "expire"
- gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --send-keys <key> to make change
public
FWIW, you may want to send that to subkeys.pgp.net, which is where Matt plans to pull the keys from for the key signing. This is the default keyserver in recent gnupg releases. I think that there is a sync between pgp.mit.edu and subkeys.pgp.net, but I'm not positive.
The gnupg default is subkeys.pgp.net because pgp.mit.edu runs ancient keyserver software that has many known problems (it ignores photo packets, can munge up multiple subkeys, and other annoyances).
Matt Domsch wrote:
I'm volunteering to run a GPG keysigning party at the FUDCon in Raleigh in January.
And thank you for that Matt. It should be fun.
Keysignings are good ways to get to meet people face-to-face (with a government-issued photo ID to boot!), and serves to extend the GPG Web of Trust.
http://barcamp.org/FUDConRaleigh2008
for details on how to send me your keys beforehand.
Do you want folks to send you their keys or just their key info (the output of gpg --fingerprint)? The wiki says send your key, but the command used won't send the key, just the key info.
If you haven't seen it before, I'd recommend giving a look at the "Efficient Group Key Signing Method" by Len Sassaman and Phil Zimmermann, documented at http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt
It cuts a lot of the tediousness out of a key signing involving more than just a few people.
I'd be glad to offer any help you might want in preparing for this. I've only helped organize a few key signings, but I've been using and following PGP for what seems like ages. :)
On Wed, Jan 02, 2008 at 09:44:23PM -0500, Todd Zullinger wrote:
Matt Domsch wrote:
I'm volunteering to run a GPG keysigning party at the FUDCon in Raleigh in January.
And thank you for that Matt. It should be fun.
Keysignings are good ways to get to meet people face-to-face (with a government-issued photo ID to boot!), and serves to extend the GPG Web of Trust.
http://barcamp.org/FUDConRaleigh2008
for details on how to send me your keys beforehand.
Do you want folks to send you their keys or just their key info (the output of gpg --fingerprint)? The wiki says send your key, but the command used won't send the key, just the key info.
gpg --fingerprint is fine - I'm pulling the keys themselves from the public keyservers based on the fingerprint. This makes sure the keys get published at least once to the keyservers (and of course, to be of benefit after the keysigning, they'll have to be published again.)
If you haven't seen it before, I'd recommend giving a look at the "Efficient Group Key Signing Method" by Len Sassaman and Phil Zimmermann, documented at http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt
It cuts a lot of the tediousness out of a key signing involving more than just a few people.
yep. That's basically my plan. So far only ~14 people have sent me keys, so even bicycle chain won't take but a few minutes. I'll email everyone who has sent keys, and fedora-devel, the instructions early next week for getting the plaintext list of keys, the keyring I've compiled from the sent fingerprints, the SHAx sums and the rest.
I'd be glad to offer any help you might want in preparing for this. I've only helped organize a few key signings, but I've been using and following PGP for what seems like ages. :)
You bet - please keep me honest too. :-)
On Wed, Jan 02, 2008 at 09:13:32PM -0600, Matt Domsch wrote:
On Wed, Jan 02, 2008 at 09:44:23PM -0500, Todd Zullinger wrote:
If you haven't seen it before, I'd recommend giving a look at the "Efficient Group Key Signing Method" by Len Sassaman and Phil Zimmermann, documented at http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt
It cuts a lot of the tediousness out of a key signing involving more than just a few people.
yep. That's basically my plan. So far only ~14 people have sent me keys, so even bicycle chain won't take but a few minutes. I'll email everyone who has sent keys, and fedora-devel, the instructions early next week for getting the plaintext list of keys, the keyring I've compiled from the sent fingerprints, the SHAx sums and the rest.
I've compiled the list of keys for the FUDCon keysigning. These 20 are whom I have. If you're not on this list, and still want to participate, you may, details to follow.
pub 1024D/92F0FC09 2001-04-16 Matt Domsch mdomsch@alum.mit.edu pub 1024D/BD113717 1997-09-19 Paul W. Frields stickster@gmail.com pub 1024D/116521D9 2000-10-11 David Woodhouse (Insecure work key) dwmw2@redhat.com pub 1024D/93054260 2001-03-22 Tom Callaway (spot) tcallawa@redhat.com pub 1024D/1728D29B 2007-12-15 Lee Lorentz (WB0TRA) lee@wb0tra.no-ip.org pub 1024D/CCAF484E 2007-04-17 Ricky Zhou ricky.zhou@gmail.com pub 1024D/99B1F444 2006-04-02 G. Wolfe Woodbury ggw@wolves.durham.nc.us pub 1024D/7BB612C9 2001-06-02 Kevin Sonney (The Alchemist) kevin@sonney.com pub 1024D/8929CFFC 2006-12-05 Chris Tyler chris@tylers.info pub 1024D/ED00D312 2000-06-21 Douglas E. Warner silfreed@silfreed.net pub 1536R/243A1329 1996-12-05 David Woodhouse david@woodhou.se pub 1024D/2E3F0935 2007-05-29 Yaakov Nemoy loupgaroublond@gmail.com pub 1024D/87EF16E8 2007-02-27 Tyler Owen tyler.l.owen@gmail.com pub 1024D/7A47522D 2006-12-22 John Poelstra poelcat@gmail.com pub 1024D/78688BF5 2002-10-03 Nalin Dahyabhai nalin@dahyabhai.net pub 1024D/3B6A5B89 1999-09-16 Jack Neely jjneely@ncsu.edu pub 2048R/BEAF0CE3 2006-07-04 Todd M. Zullinger tmz@pobox.com pub 1024D/D74908ED 2007-12-31 Eric Harlan Christensen eric@christensenplace.us pub 1024D/B05A59F7 2004-03-01 Dennis Gilmore dennis@auroralinux.org pub 1024D/0D86AF59 2006-01-21 Jonathan Steffan (daMaestro) jonathansteffan@gmail.com
See the URL above for the process. Before the keysigning, you _must_ download a copy of http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning.txt and verify that your key is correct on there. You'll be asked at the keysigning to confirm that your key is correct in that file.
Second, you must run both sha1sum and md5sum on the fudcon-keysigning.txt file, and validate that it in fact matches:
http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning.txt.md5sum 0c799b9b70cf87e0039631e0cfd1586a fudcon-keysigning.txt
http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning.txt.sha1sum d3fa0cda1d77cde8608c2506e88cb3cd60764c43 fudcon-keysigning.txt
At the keysigning, I'll read these values. Everyone confirms they match, therefore we know your key as listed in the keyring is what everyone expects it to be. Then we each, in order, show our IDs for everyone to validate, and then each person can decide if they want to sign that person's key.
After the keysigning, you can use a tool like caff from the pgp-tools package to sign each person's key and mail it to them.
I'll see you all next Saturday!
Thanks, Matt
On Mon, Jan 07, 2008 at 05:14:15PM -0600, Matt Domsch wrote:
On Wed, Jan 02, 2008 at 09:13:32PM -0600, Matt Domsch wrote:
On Wed, Jan 02, 2008 at 09:44:23PM -0500, Todd Zullinger wrote:
If you haven't seen it before, I'd recommend giving a look at the "Efficient Group Key Signing Method" by Len Sassaman and Phil Zimmermann, documented at http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt
It cuts a lot of the tediousness out of a key signing involving more than just a few people.
yep. That's basically my plan. So far only ~14 people have sent me keys, so even bicycle chain won't take but a few minutes. I'll email everyone who has sent keys, and fedora-devel, the instructions early next week for getting the plaintext list of keys, the keyring I've compiled from the sent fingerprints, the SHAx sums and the rest.
I've compiled the list of keys for the FUDCon keysigning. These 20 are whom I have. If you're not on this list, and still want to participate, you may, details to follow.
I meant to do the validations using the fingerprints, not just the --list-keys output.
http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning-fingerprints.txt http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning-fingerprints.txt... http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning-fingerprints.txt... http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/fudcon-keysigning-fingerprints.txt... (signed by me)
Please download the .txt file, and run md5sum and sha1sum against it and compare with the values posted there. They should match. Also be sure your key fingerprint is correct in that file.
These, the keyring, etc. can be found at http://domsch.com/linux/fedora/fudcon2008/. Please download and validate them yourselves.
Thanks, Matt
Matt Domsch wrote:
After the keysigning, you can use a tool like caff from the pgp-tools package to sign each person's key and mail it to them.
I'd like to put in a plug for not using caff (read: I'm a pedant ;).
There are three things you want to verify when you certify (sign) a key:
1) The identity of the person asking me to certify their key. 2) The key's fingerprint, id, size, and type 3) The email address(es) associated with the key
1 can be accomplished via a drivers license or other form of ID.
2 is achieved by checking that the key info presented at the signing matches what is available on the public keyservers
3 is the trickier one. When you sign a key, you are signing the primary key + the user id(s). Most newer PGP keys consist of a primary key and one or more encryption subkeys.
Using caff as I understand it, you would sign each uid on a key and then encrypt it to the address on the uid. This encryption is intended to verify that the key actually belongs to the recipient and that they can receive email add the address on the key.
This is not entirely adequate for a few reasons. Firstly, it doesn't really verify that the uid you are signing belongs to the person at the address (see below). Secondly, it fails completely for anyone that doesn't have an encryption subkey. (Some people have a master key that they use for signing and for acquiring signatures on and another key that they use for day to day use and receiving encrypted mail. Not common perhaps, but a perfectly valid usage of gpg, and no reason to deny someone a signature on their key.)
What you really want to do is ask the key owner to sign some text or data of your choosing and send it to you. That ensures that the thing you are signing (the primary key + uid) is under the control of the key owner and that they can receive mail at the address in the uid.
I prodded the folks on gnupg-users about this a year or so ago. You can read the full thread starting at[1] and David Shaw's assertion that "sending an signed key via encrypted mail does not ensure anything about the key owner." at[2].
Ingo Kloecker was kind enough to post a short perl script in that thread that he used to send out challenge mail after a keysigning. I modified it a bit and used it after the last keysigning at my local LUG (all the bugs are surely mine).
In the off chance that anyone is interested, I've posted that script at[3]. It requires the perl modules Text::Autoformat and Text::Template (among other standard modules).
[1] http://marc.info/?l=gnupg-users&m=115221259531231&w=2 [2] http://marc.info/?l=gnupg-users&m=115230714808866&w=2 [3] http://tmz.fedorapeople.org/scripts/gpg-send-challenges
On Mon, 2008-01-07 at 17:14 -0600, Matt Domsch wrote:
At the keysigning, I'll read these values. Everyone confirms they match, therefore we know your key as listed in the keyring is what everyone expects it to be. Then we each, in order, show our IDs for everyone to validate, and then each person can decide if they want to sign that person's key.
After the keysigning, you can use a tool like caff from the pgp-tools package to sign each person's key and mail it to them.
If I may be so bold, last time we did this, a very small proportion of attendees actually sent around signed keys. Or did they just not want to sign mine? :-) If you've got a laptop and install pgp-tools on it, you can run through the signing routine at least once in the room so we can clear up any confusion that might prevent propagating the "web of trust."
"PWF" == Paul W Frields stickster@gmail.com writes:
PWF> If I may be so bold, last time we did this, a very small PWF> proportion of attendees actually sent around signed keys.
Yeah, I found that I got back home, got busy putting out fires and such (plus my wife decided that we should buy a new car on the way home from the airport) and I ended up forgetting what I was supposed to do to do all of the signing.
I haven't sent my key info in this time out of embarrassment.
- J<
Jason L Tibbitts III wrote:
Yeah, I found that I got back home, got busy putting out fires and such (plus my wife decided that we should buy a new car on the way home from the airport) and I ended up forgetting what I was supposed to do to do all of the signing.
I haven't sent my key info in this time out of embarrassment.
I'd hazard a guess that most everyone can understand getting busy and sidetracked and that anyone who attended the last keysigning won't hold it against you. :)
On Monday 07 January 2008, Jason L Tibbitts III wrote:
"PWF" == Paul W Frields stickster@gmail.com writes:
PWF> If I may be so bold, last time we did this, a very small PWF> proportion of attendees actually sent around signed keys.
Yeah, I found that I got back home, got busy putting out fires and such (plus my wife decided that we should buy a new car on the way home from the airport) and I ended up forgetting what I was supposed to do to do all of the signing.
I haven't sent my key info in this time out of embarrassment.
- J<
I missed the gpg session last time sine i had to do the EPEL presentation. however it would be good to get some of it done while there. perhaps we could have the session at a time by itself. at the beginning or end of the day.
Dennis
Paul W. Frields wrote:
If I may be so bold, last time we did this, a very small proportion of attendees actually sent around signed keys. Or did they just not want to sign mine? :-)
I've had that experience myself. I made a note to shower before the next keysigning.
If you've got a laptop and install pgp-tools on it, you can run through the signing routine at least once in the room so we can clear up any confusion that might prevent propagating the "web of trust."
Speaking of the web, here's a graph of the keys submitted so far and how they are related. The graph was made using the sig2dot script[1] and neato (from graphviz).
Keys are colored:
* Red proportional to sigs received (in arrows) * Green proportional to the ratio of sigs given to sigs received * Blue proportional to sigs given (out arrows)
[1] http://ftp.de.debian.org/debian/pool/main/s/sig2dot/sig2dot_0.37.tar.gz
I wrote:
Speaking of the web, here's a graph of the keys submitted so far and how they are related.
I suppose the actual graph would be handy to have too. :)
http://tmz.fedorapeople.org/fudcon9-keysigning/fudcon-graph.png
"MD" == Matt Domsch Matt_Domsch@dell.com writes:
MD> If you're not on this list, and still want to participate, you MD> may, details to follow.
Unfortunately I don't see those directions following. Did I miss the boat? I guess I can still print a bunch of copies of my key if so.
- J<
On 07 Jan 2008 23:38:09 -0600, Jason L Tibbitts III tibbs@math.uh.edu wrote:
Unfortunately I don't see those directions following. Did I miss the boat? I guess I can still print a bunch of copies of my key if so.
They're on the wiki now, and pretty much exactly that :)
On Wednesday 02 January 2008, Todd Zullinger wrote:
I'm volunteering to run a GPG keysigning party at the FUDCon in Raleigh in January.
And thank you for that Matt. It should be fun.
Is there going to be any tequila at the keysigning? [1]
-Doug
On Thu, Jan 03, 2008 at 09:50:09AM -0500, Douglas E. Warner wrote:
On Wednesday 02 January 2008, Todd Zullinger wrote:
I'm volunteering to run a GPG keysigning party at the FUDCon in Raleigh in January.
And thank you for that Matt. ??It should be fun.
Is there going to be any tequila at the keysigning? [1]
-Doug
OK, for that, yes, there will be a bottle of something on hand, most definitely. :-)
-
Dennis Gilmore -
Douglas E. Warner -
Jason L Tibbitts III -
Jesse Keating -
John Poelstra -
Jon Stanley -
Matt Domsch -
Nicolas Mailhot -
Paul W. Frields -
Todd Zullinger