On Wed, 2022-09-14 at 15:11 -0700, Adam Williamson wrote:
On Wed, 2022-09-14 at 10:25 -0500, Michael Catanzaro wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 14 2022 at 06:58:12 AM +0000, Tommy Nguyen
> <remyabel(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> > I'm not entirely convinced. See this paper:
> >
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1298.pdf
>
> I only read the abstract of this paper, but looks like the researchers
> have found that FIDO is indeed unphishable. Seems their attack relies
> on websites allowing downgrade to weaker forms of 2FA.
Yup. The thrust of the paper is: in the real world FIDO2 is usually
deployed alongside older/weaker forms of 2FA, so an attacker can
pretend to the victim that FIDO auth didn't work and convince them to
try a weaker method instead, then phish that.
Which is a reasonable point, but not necessarily relevant to us. We
*could* require only strong auth and not have weaker fallback methods.
So I have been thinking about this, how do you deal with the inevitable
fact that keys get lost or stop working if there is no alternative
authentication method?
I guess people can enroll 2 separate keys (if Feodra Infra will allow
that), but not everyone has the means to do that.
Simo.
--
Simo Sorce
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat, Inc