On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 16:00:37 -0400 (EDT), Sean wrote:
Would be nice to avoid the need for the command line. Wouldn't
a simple
popup having a boilerplate warning and the description extracted from the
rpm be sufficient? If not, what else is needed?
At least one hurdle that makes it less easy. ;)
The simple click-click-click-to-add-a-repository bears just too many
risks, because its target group would _not_ verify painstakingly what will
be added to the system configuration.
Remember this is about
generic rpm installation of any program, not just rpms containing repo
entries.
Clicking onto a local *.rpm file opens the system-install-packages command
by default, which in turn prompts the user for the root password. That is
easy and dangerous enough. As soon as system-install-packages can access
the configured online repositories in order to resolve dependencies, what
else do you need?
I suppose there should be a more verbose warning message if the
rpm isn't signed with a trusted key but beyond that how much more "secure"
can you make it?
Theoretically, _much_ more secure, e.g. with fully relocatable packages
and a user-writable RPM database, so the user can install _some_ packages
without needing superuser privileges.
--
Michael Schwendt <mschwendt(a)users.sf.net>
Fedora Core release 4 (Stentz) - Linux 2.6.12-1.1398_FC4
loadavg: 1.02 1.14 0.92