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>> It's logistically difficult to sign the repodata... but
of
>> course it could be done.
Has someone tried to get this done/accepted before?
> Is there any kind of certificate pinning in place when verifying
> the certificate of
https://mirrors.fedoraproject.org or can the
> certificate be from any trusted CA?
I'm not sure. Yum (and dnf) uses python-urlgrabber, which uses
urlgrabber, which uses curl. So, it would depend on the default
curl config.
So we could take advantage of the environment variable named
'CURL_CA_BUNDLE' to feed it with the issuing CA of
https://mirrors.fedoraproject.org 's certificate.
Has fedora a policy where it gets its certificates from?
Is it always DigiCert?
Until curl gets DANE support we could use 'CURL_CA_BUNDLE' as a poor
men's CA pinning?
http://curl.haxx.se/docs/todo.html#Support_DANE
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